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1.	  Introduction 
Homeopathy is in certain respects a paradigmatic example of a 
complementary/alternative therapy (CAM). Homeopathy relies on the 
premise that “like cures like", so a homeopath uses the same substances, 
though extremely diluted, in the treatment of ailments, which in a healthy 
person is thought to produce the symptoms of the ailment in question. The 
basic idea in homeopathy is that a putatively active substance is diluted in 
water and administered to a patient. The distinctive feature of homeopathic 
medicine, however, is that that dilution is so extreme that at the end of the 
                                       
1  This chapter is based on our paper 'The proper role of evidence in 
Complementary/Alternative medicine' in Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 35: 7-18, 2010. While 
the text and presentation has been thoroughly revised and rewritten, the main arguments are 
the same. We would like to thank Miriam Solomon, Harold Kinckaid, Asbjørn Hrobjartsson 
and Martin Marchman for comments to an earlier draft. 
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process it is unlikely that there any molecules of the putatively active 
substance remains. A common remedy has strength of 30C. This means 
that the original substance has been diluted 30 times by a factor of 100 each 
time (called a 30C remedy). This implies that the original substance has 
been diluted by a factor of no less than 
1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,00
0,000,000. Homeopaths argue, however, that the water in which the remedy 
is diluted (or the remedy itself) has a memory of the original substance, 
which is why the homeopathic remedy that may consist of nothing but pure 
water can nonetheless treat an ailment. There are widely available 
homeopathic remedies for a wide array of conditions such as anxiety, 
asthma attacks, broken bones, chicken pox, rubella and many more 
ailments. 
Clearly, our general physical and chemical theories provide no reason to 
believe that homeopathy has any effect whatsoever. Conversely, if we were 
to accept the theories behind homeopathy we would need to reject at least 
revise a large number of physical and chemical theories. In fact, 
homeopathy has been evaluated rigorously by randomized controlled trials, 
and the research has been examined in meta-analyses. Actually some trials 
have shown that there might be some effect of homeopathy, but it has been 
widely discussed what to conclude from this. The conducted studies have 
overall been of a poor quality and it is likely that some will produce 
misleading results. The overall conclusion in the established research 
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community has been that there are no clinical effects of homeopathy apart 
from placebo effects if any such are found (Shang 2005).  
Though nowhere admitted as a part of established healthcare, homeopathy 
is nonetheless widely used in most of the western world. Homeopathy is 
particularly popular in France, where it is the leading alternative therapy; it 
is advocated strongly by the royal family in England, and according to the 
2012 National Health Interview Survey, which included a comprehensive 
survey on the use of complementary health approaches by Americans, an 
estimated 5 million adults and 1 million children used homeopathy in the 
previous year (National Institutes of Health 2015). 
Something similar is true of other modes of CAM. Though prima facie 
unlikely to have any effects, and with no systematic evidence of efficacy, 
they are widely, and perhaps increasingly, used outside the established 
health care systems. Here we consider some philosophical questions that 
this raises.  
2.	  What	  is	  CAM?	  	  
The terms 'complementary/alternative medicine' or 'CAM' cover many 
different types of therapy. The expression 'alternative' indicates that a 
therapy is used as an alternative to conventional therapy, whereas 
'complementary' indicates that CAM therapies are provided merely to 
supplement conventional medicine. Apart from homeopathy, typical forms 
of CAM include e.g. acupuncture, reflexology, herbal medicine, osteopathy, 
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and meditation.   
There are three general characteristics of CAM that are of interest here, and 
they are illustrated by the case of homeopathy. First, CAM therapies are not 
based on evidence derived from scientific methods or findings. Second, 
CAM theories are even in some cases inconsistent with our best and most 
corroborated theories of the natural world. Third, CAM is not provided in 
the established health care system, whether this is publicly funded or not. 
Of course, there are exceptions to these general rules. Yet they hold in 
many instances, and they are important for what we want to discuss below.  
Conventional medicine is conventional in the three senses that CAM is not. 
Conventional medicine is based on evidence generally provided by the use 
of methods that are congruent with the methods of inquiry used in science, 
whereas the efficacy of CAM has proved difficult to establish with the same 
methods. The efficacy of conventional medicine is explained by, or at 
consistent with, broadly accepted scientific theories, and conventional 
medicine is broadly implemented in the established health care.  
In the literature, one finds various attempts to offer relatively broad 
definitions of CAM (e.g., World Health Organization, 2015; National 
Institutes of Health, 2015). For example, the definition offered by WHO 
refers to ‘a broad set of health care practices that are not part of that 
country's own tradition and are not integrated into the dominant health care 
system’. […]. No consensus on a satisfactory definition has emerged in the 
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literature, but we need not go into this dispute here. It is enough that we 
have the paradigm cases of CAM in mind and the characteristic features 
that distinguish CAM from conventional medicine.  
3.	  CAM	  and	  the	  Evidence	  Requirement	  
The use of CAM in the Western world appears to be increasing (Eisenberg 
et al., 1998, World Health Organization, 2013), though the exact extent is 
difficult to estimate due to the heterogeneity of data, as well as the use of a 
variety of different definitions of CAM (Eardly et al., 2012).  
Below we will focus on some of the wider philosophical questions that this 
raise. Maybe CAM should be admitted as part of established health care? If 
not, then what are the exact reasons that justify the exclusion of CAM?  
It is easiest to present the various positions in this debate if we start with 
the main concern that members of the medical profession and the research 
community often have felt about admitting CAM into the established health 
care system (e.g. Goldacre 2008; Singh & Ernst 2008):  
(1) The Evidence Requirement. Treatments offered in 
established health care/public health care should undergo testing 
by randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to ensure evidence of 
efficacy or effectiveness. 
(2) Most CAM interventions have not been evaluated rigorously 
by RCTs (randomized clinical trials), and those that have show 
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little or no effect. So, either there is no evidence suggesting that 
various modes of CAM are effective, or there is evidence to the 
effect that they are not effective.  
(3) So, CAM should not be provided as part of an established 
health care/public health care system. 
Many proponents of CAM have not been persuaded by this argument, and 
a number of replies to the argument can be discerned in the literature. (a) 
Some argue that CAM should be exempted from the Evidence 
Requirement, as evaluation by RCT is impossible even in principle. In 
section 4, we consider and reject an argument to this effect. (b) Some 
proponents of CAM have insisted that there are other ways (apart from 
RCTs) by which one can gather the evidence necessary for evaluating CAM, 
or that the notion of evidence as presupposed in RCTs is irrelevant for 
CAM. We discuss this objection in section 5. (c) Finally, it has regularly 
been suggested that the Evidence Requirement should be rejected. After all, 
it might be said, conventional medicine is far from always is tested by 
RCTs, and this shows that we should lower the standards of evidence in 
general, admitting more and less rigorously tested treatments. We argue in 
section 6 that this is not the case, though we suggest that the Evidence 
Requirement needs to be modified. 
Finally, in section 7 we discuss the claim that choices of CAM need not be 
made on the basis of evidence of the sort assumed in the evidence 
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requirement above. Rather, CAM should be seen as akin to a lifestyle or 
value choice. Such choices may be entirely reasonable, we argue, even when 
made in the absence of evidence of efficacy, or when evidence of lack of 
efficacy is available. We consider whether this would constitute a reason to 
reject the Evidence Requirement (and argue that it is not), and consider 
certain other normative implications.  
4.	  Randomized	  Clinical	  Trials	  and	  CAM	   
Today's medical practice generally seeks to adhere to the Evidence 
Requirement, i.e. that medical practices should be backed by evidence. 
While there are many admissible types of evidence and procedures by which 
evidence is collected, the gold standard for evidence in medicine is often 
considered to be the randomized controlled trial (RCT).  This is the main 
idea in what is known as evidence-based medicine. 
Let us briefly outline the main idea of a RCT. The aim of a RCT is to assess 
the effect or efficacy of some sort of clinical treatment or other form of 
medical intervention, typically a specific medication aimed at a particular 
health condition, but in principle it could be any form of intervention 
offered with the aim of improving health. The strategy in RCT is to assess 
the outcome the intervention by using it on human subjects, typically 
subjects drawn from a larger group of patients with a particular disorder. 
The subjects are divided into two groups. One group receives the 
intervention, and the other group, the control group, does not. The control 
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group instead receives either placebo, or some well-known treatment. This 
permits a comparison of the outcome of the intervention. It is considered 
crucial for the RCT that subjects are divided into an intervention group and 
a control group by a randomization procedure. Moreover, at least the most 
rigorous trials are blinded, which means that subjects, administrators 
and/or researchers are kept ignorant about whether a particular subject 
belongs to the intervention group or the control group. 
The first question is whether the use of RCT is possible or appropriate with 
respect to CAM. Some CAM practitioners reject this and hence reject the 
Evidence Requirement. One argument focuses on the claim that CAM 
essentially is holistic and relies on a unique and individual relationship 
between the patient and the practitioner (Frank, 2002; Walach, 2003). Thus, 
the argument goes, the RCT procedure itself will destroy the beneficial 
property of the treatment. For instance, Walach (2003) writes:  
Suppose that the “active” principle of homeopathy resides in a 
complex mix of the homeopathic situation between patient, 
practitioner, remedy, history of medicinal substances and their 
use as codified in the homeopathic material medica, with some 
mental interaction between the doctor and patient—such as a 
flash of security, a spark of trust and hope. In other words, 
suppose homeopathy is a kind of field effect with no single 
element that can be isolated and attributed to the remedy alone. 
  
9 
If that were the true picture, then testing the remedy alone 
would be like taking one transistor out of a radio set and testing 
it for its capacity to play music. (9–10)  
The suggestion is that the effect of CAM cannot be assigned to any single 
causal factor of a specific component in the intervention. CAM is not like a 
pill whose chemical properties account for the entire effect. Rather, the 
beneficial effects of CAM reside holistically in the whole of the interaction 
between patient and practitioner.  
This worry about the use of RTC to evaluate CAM fails to acknowledge the 
distinction between what is known as explanatory (or causal) trials and pragmatic 
trials (White, 2002). Explanatory (or causal) trials generally measure efficacy, 
that is, they seek to measure the specific effects of a causally active 
component in an intervention. Typically, explanatory trials do so by 
assessing the treatment effects of a treatment produced under ideal, 
controlled conditions in a research clinic by carefully isolating the treatment 
effects from other effects. So, typically explanatory trials require substantial 
deviations from the usual clinical practice.  
Pragmatic trials, by contrast, measure what is known as effectiveness. They 
measure the benefit of a treatment produced in routine, ‘real world’ clinical 
practice, no matter what specific causal factors may contribute to that 
benefit. So, pragmatic trials typically do not provide conclusive information 
about causally active components in a particular treatment (Roland and 
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Torgerson, 1998; Cardini et al., 2006).  
Explanatory trials as applied to CAM, then, would seek to investigate the 
causal efficacy of a specific CAM component, such as the homeopathic 
medicine as such, or the prick of an acupuncture needle. Pragmatic trials, 
on the other hand, would aim to evaluate the clinical effectiveness of a 
CAM practice as a whole. For example, a pragmatic trial of a homeopathic 
medical intervention would aim to assess the homeopathic consultation as 
such, rather than of to seek to determine the causal effects of the specific 
homeopathic component involved in that practice. Pragmatic trials of 
homeopathic practices can be conducted by providing the treatment group 
with the whole consultation, including the homeopathic medicine, the 
meeting with the practitioner, conversation, time spent on the individual, 
and so on. The control group will receive no treatment, a sham treatment, 
or the prevailing treatment. The clinical effectiveness of these two 
regiments can then be compared. So, there is no reason in principle why 
CAM cannot be assessed in this way. Clearly, however, blinding is bound to 
present practical difficulties in pragmatic trials, and this may affect the 
quality of the trials. If a pragmatic trial is not blinded, there is a risk that it 
shows an effect, while it remains unclear whether this effect is due to the 
intervention as such, or results from bias due to lack of blinding, or placebo 
effects.  
A somewhat similar objection to the Evidence Requirement highlights what 
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is felt by some to be a principal obstacle to using conventional research 
methods to evaluate treatments with a perspective on illness and disease 
other than that of conventional medicine (Hammerschlag, 1998; 
MacPherson et al., 2002). The objection is that since CAM and 
conventional medicine rely on fundamentally different assumptions about 
the nature of disease and human biology, RCTs cannot be used to measure 
effect of CAM. The following quote exemplify this view:  
The whole process [of evaluating CAM with RCTs] can be 
equated to asking a sculptor to sculpt with a paintbrush to prove 
he is an “artist”. The need to conform to an existing tool can 
undermine the very process we are trying to evaluate. In the case 
of the sculptor, the need to use the paintbrush undermines his 
or her ability to demonstrate his or her artistic skills, and in the 
case of the acupuncturist, the need to use standardized 
interventions (as in most RCTs) may undermine his or her 
ability to effectively treat the patient. (Ahn and Kaptchuk, 2005, 
41)  
Again, it seems that this objection (even if otherwise sound) applies only to 
RCT in the form of explanatory trials, not to pragmatic trials. So, even if 
true that the very process of conducting a RCT will 'undermine the very 
process we are trying to evaluate' this would seem to apply only to 
explanatory trials, not to pragmatic trials. Nothing in the objection shows 
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that is not possible to consider a CAM intervention as a whole, and 
compare it to a conventional intervention.  
In saying this, we have not, of course, considered the various logistical and 
practical problems that are bound to arise in setting up pragmatic trials. 
Surely, blinding, and in particular double blinding, may pose practical 
difficulties. It is, for example, not easy to blind an acupuncture trial so that 
the patient and/or the practitioner does not know whether they actually 
receive acupuncture. Several attempts have been made to solve this practical 
problem, however. There have, for example, been RCTs in which the 
control group received sham acupuncture, conducted by gluing needles to 
the patients’ skin in order to blind the patients (Filshie and Cummings, 
1999). Other types of sham acupuncture include shallow needling and 
needling at non-acupoint sites. The blinding requirement might also be met 
by blinding either the assessor of the results or the statisticians involved.  
There seems to be no reason in principle why CAM could not be evaluated 
by RCT. Note however, that even if it were correct that CAM could not be 
evaluated using RCTs (including pragmatic trials), this by itself would not 
imply that CAM should be exempted from the Evidence Requirement. All 
this would show would be that CAM could not even in principle meet the 
Evidence Requirement.  
5.	  Are	  there	  other	  kinds	  of	  evidence	  for	  CAM?	   
So far no reason has emerged why CAM cannot be evaluated by using 
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pragmatic trial. Indeed, a considerable number of RCTs assessing the 
effectiveness of CAM have been conducted, though the general quality is 
debatable (a search in the Cochrane Library in June 2015 returned more 
than 12.000 trials, over 300 Cochrane Reviews and over 1.400 other reviews 
of complementary therapies). Generally, there are many poor studies 
allowing for much bias and risk of misleading evidence. The systematic 
reviews performed on these studies, however, generally suggest that CAM 
has no discernible effects or that there is insufficient evidence to judge 
whether a therapy is effective, due to the poor quality of the studies 
included (e.g. McCarney, Linde & Lasserson 2008; Paley, Johnson, Tashani 
& Bagnall 2011).  
At this point some proponents of CAM insist that there are other sources 
of evidence that we might draw upon, and they indicate the effectiveness of 
CAM. Sometimes it is suggested that the fact that most CAM treatments 
have existed for many years provides evidence of their effectiveness. For 
example, Walach (2003) argues:  
Homeopathy has some clinical effectiveness. If it did not, it 
would have died out. Indeed it is more sought after now by 
patients at a time when modern medicine prides itself in being 
more powerful than ever. (7)  
We might refer to these lines of reasoning the evolutionary argument.  Though 
the evolutionary argument may at first seem intuitively compelling, it is far 
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from clear that evolutionary arguments are sound when applied to 
treatments offered in CAM or medicine in general. For the evolutionary 
argument to carry conviction, people need to be able to adapt their 
purchasing choices to what is clinically effective. But it is hardly reasonable 
to believe that this condition is met. It may seem plausible that people can 
adapt their purchasing choices to treatments that immediately and 
significantly decrease pain or improve well-being. However, in general it 
seems hard to believe that consumers can adapt their purchasing choices to 
treatments that are clinically effective or more effective than alternatives 
short of systematic independent information about this. The reason, again, 
is that it seems impossible for the individual consumer (patient) to predict 
whether one purchase would be better than another in terms of effect, or 
whether a purchase was unnecessary because the patient would have 
recovered spontaneously.  
Thus, it is doubtful if the continued existence of a variety of CAMs on the 
market is best explained by their clinical effect. Consumers and patients 
simply lack the information necessary to develop preferences ensuring that 
only clinically effective treatments survive, and no other mechanism to 
select effective modes is in place. It is worth reminding that many 
treatments now known to be ineffective were used in conventional 
medicine up to the 1800s and had at that time existed for hundreds of years. 
It should also be noted that providers of CAM have a direct financial 
incentive in maintaining the presumption that the therapies they offer are 
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effective. Survival on the market is no guarantee for effectiveness.  
But there might be other forms of evidence suggesting the effects of CAM, 
a view suggested in the following quote:  
In therapeutics as well, there are numerous examples where the 
causal relationship of treatment and effect is convincing without 
appeal to anything other than simple observation of a single 
case. (Tonelli and Callahan, 2001, 1215)  
Both providers and users of CAM could appeal to this idea: at least in some 
instances, we simply know from our experience of individual patients that 
CAM is effective. There is surely a certain intuitive appeal to cases where a 
patient’s long-standing symptoms disappear shortly after an intervention. 
Yet one needs to stress the fundamental problem in this line of reasoning: 
The practitioner, relying on her sense that individual clients benefit from 
the treatment provided, simply lacks information about whether the clients 
would also have improved by another treatment, for example, a treatment 
provided by another practitioner or by no treatment at all (i.e., whether the 
patient would have recovered spontaneously).  
In short, the main problem with appeals to individual experience of clinical 
effect is the lack of a control group. Control groups are essential to 
demonstrations of the effectiveness of treatment. No reason why 
comparison with a control group when considering the effectiveness of 
CAM is not needed has yet been put forward. It seems very unlikely, 
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therefore, that evidence for the effectiveness of CAM can reasonably come 
from any other source than RCTs.  
6.	  Lowering	  the	  standards	  of	  evidence?	  	  
As is well known, conventional medicine is far from being fully evidence 
based in the sense of being thoroughly based on evidence of effectiveness 
determined by RCTs. Most newly introduced conventional interventions are 
tested rigorously, but this is not the case for many established interventions 
that are used routinely. Proponents of CAM may object that the Evidence 
Requirement cannot be consistently applied to CAM, while parts of 
conventional medicine is exempted. The question is whether there is a case 
to be made that the standards of evidence should be lowered for CAM, 
given that many conventional treatments have not been evaluated by RCTs.  
There are two related responses to this objection. First, there are 
compelling ethical reasons why not all conventional therapies have been 
tested by RCTs as it would in many cases be ethically objectionable to do 
so. This typically concerns treatments that are used routinely and where 
there are good reasons - deriving from observational studies or our 
background knowledge - to believe that if the treatment is not provided, the 
patient will die, or suffer great harm. An example could be surgery of 
children. Few parents are willing to let their child participate in an RCT if 
the standard treatment is used routinely and there are convincing reasons to 
believe in the effect of the treatment.  
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This suggests that one should accept a modified version of the Evidence 
Requirement:  
The Modified Evidence Requirement. Treatments offered in 
established health care/public health care should undergo testing 
by RCT to ensure evidence of efficacy/effectiveness, except 
when ethical constraints prevent this. 
Clearly, the Modified Evidence Requirement does not justify exempting 
CAM from RCT. It is not the case that we have general reasons to fear that 
the consequences of foregoing a particular mode of CAM will have serious 
adverse effects. So, there is no ethical obstacle to evaluating CAM by 
pragmatic trials. Note that the same applies to many the conventional 
therapies that have not been tested rigorously.  
The second reason for not exempting CAM from a requirement of 
providing evidence for efficacy is more general. CAM and conventional 
medicine differ significantly with respect to plausibility when viewed against 
our widely accepted background theories. Consider again homeopathy. The 
simple fact is that when viewed against the backdrop of the vast 
accumulated body of relevant scientific theory (in particular physics and 
chemistry), it is just extremely implausible that homeopathic interventions 
can have any effects whatsoever. If we accept standard theories in physics 
and chemistry, we are bound to very skeptical that homeopathy works (and 
if we accept homeopathic theory, we are committed to rejecting a large 
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number of physical and chemical theories).  
Conventional treatments, by contrast, are fully compatible with established 
scientific theories. It is generally not the case that acceptance of standard 
theory commits us to thinking that any particular mode of conventional 
medicine is very unlikely to have any effects, although the fact that one 
conventional therapy is compatible with scientific theories is typically not a 
reason to favor this therapy over other equally compatible conventional 
therapies. In part, this is why RCTs are needed. However, any CAM therapy 
whose effects appears highly unlikely given accepted scientific theory, 
thereby incurs an extra burden of proof, or more genuine evidence of 
effectiveness. Hence, it seems reasonable to insist that there is a heavier 
burden of proof resting on CAMs than on conventional therapies. 
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence (Vickers, 2000).  
7.	  Should	  decisions	  about	  CAM	  be	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  evidence	  of	  efficacy?	   
At this point one might take a step back and query the basis of the 
Evidence Requirement. The most straightforward justification of this 
demand is a conjunction of two claims. First, a rational individual would 
want to choose between optional treatments on the basis of reliable 
information about which treatment is likely to be more effective (or plain 
effective).  Second, this information can be provided only by RCTs, and 
this holds for both CAM and conventional medicine.  
Some commentators, however, suggests that a choice of CAM need not be 
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based on evidence about clinical effects. For example Borgerson (2005) 
writes that 
.... while certain acupuncture points and procedures might be 
proven effective in RCTs and adopted into mainstream 
medicine, the underlying philosophy of traditional Chinese 
medicine, including the existence of the chi or vital force and the 
commitment to health as the balance of chi will be lost [. . .] the 
naturopathic approach to health (including a commitment to 
holism, highly individualized care, and a principle of self-healing) 
will likely be left behind. For the millions of people choosing to 
spend out-of-pocket for alternative health care to- day, these 
elements of healing philosophy are of critical importance, and 
their loss would be substantial. (506)  
Borgerson says that if subjected to RCT, a crucial aspect of CAM is likely to 
be lost. This must imply that Borgerson thinks that one can chose CAM 
knowing that no evidence from RCT is available, and she suggests that is 
because of the crucial importance of one's commitment to a wider healing 
philosophy. Typically, of course, those accepting a healing philosophy will 
assume that there are beneficial effects to doing so, and that the particular 
modes of treatment recommended by the healing philosophy are effective. 
However, it is natural to interpret Borgerson as implying that the 
commitment to a wider healing philosophy can be made without possessing 
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robust evidence to the effects of that commitment, or the particular modes 
of treatment that it involves.  
Whatever the details of Borgerson's view, we think that it is attractive to 
view choice of CAM in this light. The choice of CAM could be considered 
a lifestyle choice or a value choice, a decision to join or sustain a 
community of shared values and beliefs, or perhaps something that is 
similar to undertaking a religious commitment. This has several 
implications. 
First, this sort of value choice need not be irrational despite not being based 
on reliable information about clinical effectiveness. Hence, a rational 
individual might choose CAM without reliable information about clinical 
effectiveness.  
Second, CAM communities and those purchasing CAM treatments might 
be compared to religious and quasi-religious communities. By implication 
we might say that CAM communities and those using the services should 
be accorded the same freedoms and protections as religious communities. 
There are many ways of spelling out the implications of this. One appeals to 
what is known as Mill's harm principle (after British philosopher J.S. Mill 
(1806-1873)) according to which the state is justified in limiting a person’s 
actions or to interfere in a person’s way of living only in order to prevent 
harm to third parties (Gray and Smith, 1991). Accordingly, the state should 
not interfere if people wish to join a CAM community, as long as their 
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doing so harms no one and limits nobody’s freedom of action. This is so 
even if there is no evidence showing an effect of the treatment in question 
or even evidence showing that the treatment does not have any effect. 
Hence, when CAM use is viewed as a lifestyle choice, the natural 
implication is that neither the state nor the individual rational agents need 
require rigorous evidence of the clinical effectiveness of CAM. However, 
the state might impose restrictions in special or extreme cases: for example, 
in connection with harmful or dangerous varieties of CAM—say, in the 
sense that some users are mislead into foregoing more beneficial 
conventional treatments—or when CAM is marketed under what are clearly 
false pretenses, it being claimed, for example, that there is a well-
documented clinical effect.  
Arguably a third implication (again, if we accept the basic values of liberal 
democracy) is that the state or government authorities and public officials 
should not support CAM, or offer CAM in publicly funded health care, 
unless reliable evidence testifies to its clinical effectiveness. CAM can be 
offered privately without making any claim to be backed by evidence on 
equal terms with, for example, various services offered by religious 
communities. However, if a CAM treatment is offered by the publicly 
funded health services, we ought to demand that it is evidence based. State 
health services should not offer treatments that can be accepted only by 
those with religious or quasi-religious convictions. The state should only 
offer treatments that survive rational scrutiny; and evidence is crucial to 
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fulfill this purpose. A further implication might be that in so far as the state 
has a role in guaranteeing the quality of the established health care (even if 
not funding it), the state should adopt a similar stance and back the 
Evidence Requirement (in its modified form). Consequently, the state 
should be reluctant to admit CAM in established health care without 
sufficient evidence of efficacy. 
8.	  Concluding	  remarks	  	  
We have argued that a main controversy regarding CAM concerns the 
Evidence Requirement. We have argued not only that RCTs can in principle 
be conducted on CAMs, but also that there is no other way to gather 
evidence about effectiveness in medicine. The fact that many conventional 
treatments have not been subjected to RCTs does not justify exempting 
CAM from rigorous testing. We propose that CAMs could be treated in the 
same way that the practices of religious and quasi-religious communities 
are. This implies that the state should not interfere if people wish to join a 
CAM community, i.e. use CAM or practice CAM, as long as this does not 
harm other people and does not limit other people’s freedom of action, 
regardless of lack of evidence of the medical effectiveness of the CAM in 
question. It also implies that the state should not offer CAM in public 
health care or admit CAM in established health care. The state may 
legitimately impose restrictions in cases (if there are such) where a CAM is 
harmful in some way. 
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